This paper aims to reconstruct the knowledge claims and memory politics in Polish public discourse about the Caucasus. As it highlights the importance of history and a production of a 'New History' for political use, it illuminates the role of the visual dimension in the symbolic politics of memory in Poland. The special example of the Caucasus, particularly the places of Georgia and Russia, serves to show how peripheral regions can gain prominence in the knowledge struggles and strategies of self-representation and othering of particular nations, regions and states on the geopolitical plane. 
Introduction
This analysis is an examination of discourses that determine how Polish audiences nowadays acquire and order 'knowledge' about the Caucasus, particularly Georgia and Russia, by using various mediated messages. The analysis presented here is a qualitative inquiry into the nature and structure of mainstream textual and visual representations used in Poland to make sense of the Caucasus as a geographical and political region after the fall the Soviet Union. I argue that popular knowledge about the Caucasus boils down to 'knowing mostly only one of the Caucasus countries, namely Georgia; and only one aspect of its history, namely its conflicts with Russia.
In addition, the common 'ways of talking and looking' that structure this 'knowledge' historicize Polish-Georgian relations and can be interpreted as an element of the politics of memory (Errinerungspolitik, as first introduced by Reichel) . 1 In an Eastern European context, there is a steady and observable increase in various 'normatively framed memory policies'.
2 In Poland, memory politics was officially proclaimed a political doctrine by the Law and Justice (PiS) government in 2005-2007 3 and is nowadays again high on the political agenda of the PiS government elected in October 2015. It was even branded as a 'systemic politics of history' by PiS MP Jarosław Sellin, and includes 'more history lessons at school, new museums and a telling of our version of history'. 4 Often, in texts, images and events memory examined here is shaped by everyday popular and media discourses on international relations-'popular geopolitics' in Dittmer's terms 8 -as well as the official foreign policy narratives produced by the Polish authorities from 2007 onwards. The discourse positing a Polish-Georgian historical brotherhood is understood as a phenomenon that encompasses various societal fields (journalism, politics, popular culture, film, food culture, NGO activism, tourism etc.). However, its most recognizable claims are found clearly in materials which appear in connection with discourses of journalism, politics and foreign policy.
There is broad scholarly consensus that collective memories strongly influence foreign and internal policies, public discourses and memory politics in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 9 The present paper confirms the claim that in CEE after the end of Communism, history has been re-nationalized and national history institutionalized. 10 The analysis argues that the memory battles played out by politicians heavily influence people's views on the social worlds around them and that ideas once powerfully articulated by persons with authority can be integral to the popular cultural and media production of a given society by means of what Bourdieu calls 'symbolic power'. 11 Dittmer 12 understands the ability of politicians to set the norms and givens of popular geopolitical knowledge as stemming from the modern institutional structure of societies, for example the huge role of the media in everyday people's lives. This argument is illustrated through the example of the late Polish president Lech Kaczyński who clearly acted as one of most powerful discourse setters and promoters of the Polish-Georgian brotherhood, and whose ideas were taken up by both powerful state institutions and minor private organizations.
This study examines the ways of constructing a 'New History' of a PolishGeorgian metahistorical and 'metanational' brotherhood. This particular historical narrative is imbued with meanings derived from the mainstream national identity discourse and specific foreign policy discourses, notably those concentrating on
Poland as a constant victim of the 'Russian threat'. It adds to the already vast body of research into the workings of memory in CEE which has mostly concentrated on political mythologies, national identity discourses 13 and 'historical politics.
14 The visual dimension of memory in historical discourses is often omitted from analysis. I argue that the visual, textual and material dimensions are all equally important in understanding the uses of memory within a particular discourse. Lehti, Jutila and Jokisipilä in their analysis of Estonian memory politics argue that 'visual symbols strengthen collective memories and prevent forgetting'. 15 Additionally, they problematize one specific way of legitimizing a historicized discourse on memory, namely an addition of new groups into the narrative. 16 This is also what happens in the case of Polish representations of Georgia, which are incorporated into the mainstream Polish national narrative as a fully novel element (Pierzynska 2016) .
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This operation can be understood as a legitimization of both the narrative and the postulated role of Georgia and Georgians in the Polish history.
The present analysis concentrates on the so-called 'geopolitics of memory', a term coined by Bloxham in the epilogue to his book about the Armenian genocide and its treatment within international politics. 18 The geopolitics of memory concentrates on memory battles which take place within different political camps in one country, or alternatively between states and regions. I argue that such battles 'trickle down' from the élite level to the level of popular discourse. In the case analysed here, they realize themselves in the symbolic and material infrastructure of the popular Polish 'ways of knowing' the Caucasus, particularly Georgia and Russia. In order to make sense of the geopolitical memory narratives in CEE, I
examine a large body of materials stemming from different sources. In doing this, I
follow Dittmer in his idea that in the contemporary media-saturated society, it is necessary to study all ways in which information and knowledge is mediated to the audiences.
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My understanding of geopolitical discourse is very broad and incorporates everyday text and talk as well as official foreign policy discourses and mass media. In Politics, Culture and Society, vol. 17, no. 2, 2003, pp. 191-212. 24 Dittmer, p. 37. sociology of knowledge approach to discourse, SKAD. 25 It is a 'memory game' which establishes a particular understanding of the Polish-Georgian relationship by juxtaposing both countries to Russia, and connecting them by both geopolitical and historical claims. Studies, vol. 17, no. 3, 2014, p. 231 To describe the structure the New History discourse, I use the sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD). This approach views texts, images, and all other instances through which a discourse is actualized as discursive statements. These developments provoked a very harsh reaction in Poland. It resulted in a wave of mobilization of political and material resources to help Georgia, a country which was by then in the process of being discursively framed as a 'brotherly nation', against an 'imperial' Russian attack. Today, it is hard to establish the particular chronology of the emergence of this brotherhood discourse; what is beyond doubt, though, is that Russophobic and otherwise anti-Russian elements in Polish society were fully present by then, 40 and that the Georgia-related hysteria in the media and the political mobilization of the Polish president Lech Kaczyński fell on a fertile, preprepared ground, substantiating the already emerging discourse on the special nature of Polish-Georgian historical connections.
Methods

Following
Kaczyński's trips to Tbilisi to support the Georgian president Mikheil
Saakashvili, the speeches he gave there and his attempts to mobilize all the former post-Communist and post-Soviet countries into one block that would oppose Russia in the international arena, as well as numerous events such as concerts and fundraising campaigns organized in Poland after the break out of the war produced a great abundance of textual and visual material that dealt with Georgia and the Caucasus. In spite of their various origins, nature and purposes, the Georgia-related materials examined here show an overwhelming prevalence of one specific type of discourse on Georgia and the Caucasus. It deploys a geopolitical frame of Polish- 'experts' whose 'knowledge' was imposed as the only possible view on the issue.
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According to my understanding, an existing geopolitical imagination was mobilized and elevated to the status of the dominant discourse; historical memory being a crucial component that enabled this operation. The interpretive schemes, classifications, phenomenal and narrative structures and subject positions enabled by, and generated, by this dominant discourse were so uniform that it begs a further analysis of their ideological and political underpinnings. My analysis combines various types of materials (visual, textual, audio etc.) to explore this discourse and its material and ideological effects.
Russia-the problem and its causes
The Drawing its initial energy from the view of Poland as an endangered and encircled nation, the Polish discourse on Russia has produced a distinct narration that incorporates Georgia into the most significant symbolic events of Polish history. This New History is the base for solutions to Polish and Georgian problems with Russia which are proposed by the discourse bearers.
The Polish-Georgian Alliance based on New History-the Solution
The special role ascribed to Georgia can only be understood if we take into account its political and ideological dimensions. It may seem that Georgia emerged in the public space virtually 'from nowhere' in 2008 when the Russo-Georgian war broke out.
However, this discourse is deeply rooted in the foreign policy principles of the late elements that surround this subject in the media or otherwise appear in connection with it, constitute the universe of Polish discourse on the Caucasus.
The following excerpt from the summary of a popular history book 'The Unknown Georgia. 56 The legendary status of this battle was recently exemplified in the film production Bitwa Warszawska (The Battle of Warsaw) in 2011. Jerzy Hoffman, the director of the film, is known for his historical productions invoking the Polish historical myths of Sarmatism, Messianism and the 20 th century martyrological narratives. They are often based on the classics of Polish Romance literature (Colonel Wołodyjowski 1968 , The Deluge 1974 , With Fire and Sword 1999 , An Ancient Tale 2003 . He also directed a documentary about the Ukrainian national awakening in 2008 (Ukraine, the Birth of the Nation). 57 The historical truth of whether such attacks actually took place or not is a much disputed subject in itself. Websites and discussion boards abound with threads discussing this issue; there is even a Wikipedia entry entitled 'Polish cavalry attacks on German tanks'. 58 Kolbaia, Hlebowicz and Warisch, Gruzja nieznana, p. 5. 59 Domagała, p. 141. Etnografia Polska, vol. 40, 1996, p. 39. 61 A. Kuhn, 1985 photographs may be seen as a legitimization tool for the new historical narrative: the new reading of events needs to be backed-up by 'historical proof', and the photographic medium, because of its supposed indexicality, lends itself best to that kind of discursive operation. 62 The story of Polish officers in Georgia and Georgian officers in Poland is undoubtedly a real story, but its incorporation to the wider narrative of a "freedom fight" seems to be a memory game, an ideological move made possible by the emergence of the political discourse of the 'Polish and Georgian brotherhood' and, at the same time, co-constructing and legitimizing this discourse.
The Polish national mythology is, to a great extent, composed of a martyrological 'freedom fight' narrative which has been the subject of some interesting research. 63 Zubrzycki in her study of Polish national myths defines national mythology as 'a specific telling of history, one that overemphasizes some aspects of the past while glossing over others, which weaves various historical threads into a coherent fabric, and blends historical facts with more or less accurate interpretations'. 64 The modern Polish discourse on Georgia and Russia is an example of a struggle for a correct reading of history, which builds its claims using the The recontextualization of historical events within this discourse can be further illuminated if we understand the scientific discipline of history itself as a discursive field, a social arena where various discourses compete with each other, shaping their 'issues', 'problems' to be solved and 'historical lessons' to be learned.
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The struggle is about stabilizing a particular symbolic order for a given context and making sure it achieves a dominant position either in public discourse or within various special discourses. 68 The Polish media and political discourse on the Caucasus can be viewed as a special discourse because of the relative rarity of the subject;
however, this special discourse is linked intimately with the public sphere by the resources it draws on and its evident attempt to legitimize its claims using historical knowledge. In fact, it has already produced numerous experts, who in turn continue to produce numerous publications on the subject; it has also spread to other societal fields and resulted in the emergence of such practices as visiting Georgian restaurants, flying on budget holidays to Georgia etc.
Novelty, therefore, in the discourse on the Caucasus, lies in its knowledge claims. The visual dimension stays within the long-established frame of freedom fight, oppression and messianic martyrdom. 69 One could attempt to build a chronology of images that belong to this 'discursive universe' and constitute the boundaries of discourse which are not crossed. The first image on this chronological line will be a visualisation of ancient past materialized in ancient objects and engravings (e.g., on the book cover of The Unknown Georgia), connoting the continuity of the shared Georgian-Polish past going a long way back in time. There follow images of freedom fight, epitomized by the generalized 'officer' image.
Examples of this are found in the book discussed here, but also, for example, in Jerzy 
Values and the dispositifs of discourse
The Slovo, vol. 22, no. 2, 2010, pp. 46-65. Interestingly enough, it is precisely the Museum of the Warsaw Uprising Again, the classification process uses the similarity of numbers here, as it would otherwise be perfectly possible to convey the same message by using, for example, 
%E2%80%9Eczechoslowacja-1968-%E2%80%93-gruzja-2008%E2%80%9D/
The monument, concert and book presentation mentioned earlier, all co-organized by and held within the premises of the Museum of the Warsaw Uprising, testify to the institutional means that the Polish discourse on Georgia has at its disposal and which it forms part of. Following Keller, I use Foucault's notion of dispositif to make sense of the institutional infrastructure in which this discourse is embedded: 'dispositifs are the real means for the realization of the external power-effects of a discourse', that is the changes it introduces or elicits in the situation being addressed. 77 The historical claims made within the discourse are legitimized by the authority of the above mentioned institutions.
It is also within institutions that images are produced and circulated; for the production and circulation of images one needs to possess at least some financial or other material means, which are most easily available in institutions. 
Dimensions
Discursive statements and material goals
Problem
Imperialist Russia threatening its neighbours, especially Georgia.
Poland and the Baltic countries will be attacked next.
Causes
Russia's imperial tradition, barbarity, autocracy;
Russia's 'Soviet mentality'; wish to regain power in its near abroad;
Russia's irritation at Poland's support for Georgia and Poland's opposition against Russian policies. 
Knowledge struggles
establishing the correct interpretations of history and institutionalizing them;
promoting the newly discovered common Polish and Georgian history; combating the Communist discourse on friendly Polish-Soviet relations.
Values
Patriotism;
heroic tradition of Polish and Georgian officers; love of freedom: 'for our freedom and yours'. Polish discourse on the Caucasus, specifically Georgia and Russia, produces Visual images add to the general message of this Russophobic discourse, and legitimate its knowledge claims, e.g. by the common belief in the indexicity and 80 T. Zarycki, Russia's Identity in International Relations. Images, Perceptions, Misperceptions, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 133. 81 N. Batiashvili, 'The "Myth" of the Self: The Georgian National Narrative The power-effects of the discourse encompass a broad set of social fields.
Although this paper is concerned with the production of a new type of history, examples found in the materials suggest that the historical and ideological claims were transferred to fields as distant from history as tourism and co-operation in nongovernmental projects. Even in the touristic representations of Georgia as a holiday destination there is talk about the Russo-Georgian war and Poland's significance in supporting Georgia against Russia (e.g., in Tripadvisor discussions). The notion of a special community of the Polish and Georgian national spirits is present in the travelogue books about the Caucasus as well as in numerous Caucasus-related blogs, set up mostly by volunteers sent to Georgia to perform various projects. Interestingly, the authors of all such blogs which I have seen up to now, are based in Georgia, although Polish development aid policy is said to cover the whole of the Caucasus region.
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Discursive statements are aided by the production of images aimed at providing an instant reaction in the viewers. Common knowledge has it that 'a picture is worth a thousand words', and it seems that in the context of producing historical knowledge, it may really be easier to induce a desired response in the audience using a well-known Solidarność-logo than discussing at length the similarities of the Georgian and Polish geopolitical situations in the 19 th and 20 th century.
What remains to be investigated are representations of other Caucasus countries and republics within the Russian Federation, notably Chechnya. However, it is important to bear in mind that Georgia is the country which often seems to be 83 Lehti, Jutila and Jokisipilä, p. 397. 84 Wieloletni Program Współpracy Rozwojowej 2012 -2015 [Longstanding Development Aid Programme 2012 -2015 . 
